With decades of experience navigating the intersection of international business and public policy, Priya Jaiswal is uniquely positioned to dissect the latest security proposal from the Department of Homeland Security. Her work in market analysis gives her a sharp perspective on how geopolitical shifts can influence economic realities, from tourism to international investment. In our conversation, we explored the intricate details of the proposed rule, which would require travelers from over three dozen allied nations to submit years of social media and personal data. We delved into the specific security objectives behind this massive data collection effort, the immense logistical challenges of scaling such a program, and the potential chilling effect on both free speech and the U.S. travel industry. The discussion also covered the rationale for demanding extensive family histories and how feedback from international partners might ultimately shape this controversial policy.
The proposal requires five years of social media history and even photo metadata from Visa Waiver Program travelers. What specific threats is this designed to uncover, and can you walk me through the step-by-step process of how this data would be analyzed for an ESTA application?
The fundamental goal is to build a more dimensional picture of an individual that goes far beyond what a passport and a basic background check can provide. Security agencies are looking for the breadcrumbs that people leave in their digital lives. This could be anything from subtle endorsements of extremist ideologies to connections with individuals on watchlists, or even sudden, unexplained changes in online behavior that might signal radicalization. The process would likely be a two-tiered system. First, an automated algorithm would scan the five years of submitted data for red flags—keywords, specific images, unusual network connections, or inconsistencies with the rest of the application. If the system flags a profile, it would then be escalated to a human analyst for a manual deep dive. That analyst would examine the context, looking for nuance the algorithm might miss, before making a final recommendation on the ESTA application. It’s an attempt to find the needle in a digital haystack before that person ever boards a plane.
Non-VWP travelers already submit social media data. How will the screening for ESTA applicants from the 40-odd Visa Waiver Program countries differ, and what metrics or anecdotes can you share about the challenges of scaling this collection and analysis process effectively?
The difference is a matter of scale and expectation. Travelers who require a visa are already subject to a more intensive, individualized screening process, including in-person interviews. The system is built for that level of scrutiny. The Visa Waiver Program, on the other hand, was designed for streamlined, high-volume travel from trusted, allied nations—we’re talking about roughly 40 countries, mostly in Europe and Asia, whose citizens are generally considered low-risk. Applying the same deep-dive data analysis to this enormous pool of travelers is a monumental challenge. You’re not just increasing the workload; you’re changing the entire philosophy of the program. The biggest hurdle will be managing the sheer volume of data and the inevitable rise in “false positives,” where benign posts are flagged out of cultural or linguistic context. We’ve seen in smaller programs how an off-color joke or a political statement can get an application stuck in review for weeks, and scaling that to millions of travelers from VWP countries could create logistical chaos and significant diplomatic friction.
President Trump dismissed concerns about tourism, but advocates worry about free speech. Based on similar programs, what real-world impact might this have on tourism from allied nations, and what specific safeguards exist to prevent this data from being used to penalize administration critics?
The economic impact could be quite significant, regardless of the president’s confidence. For many international business travelers, academics, and tourists, the U.S. is one of several options. Faced with a choice between attending a conference in New York, which requires handing over five years of private digital history, or one in London or Toronto with no such requirement, many may simply choose the path of least resistance and greatest privacy. It introduces a friction point that wasn’t there before. The free speech concern is even more profound. The safeguards are, frankly, quite vague. When an agency is looking for “anti-American” or “derogatory” information, that’s an incredibly subjective standard. A European journalist who has written critically about U.S. foreign policy or a student who participated in a protest could theoretically be flagged. This creates a chilling effect where people may feel they have to self-censor their online opinions if they ever plan to visit the U.S., which is a troubling prospect for citizens of allied, democratic nations.
The proposal expands the ESTA to include extensive family details like birthplaces and phone numbers, far beyond just parents’ names. What is the specific security rationale for this, and can you provide an example of how this third-party family data would be practically used in a traveler’s assessment?
The rationale is rooted in network analysis. Security officials aren’t just vetting an individual; they are vetting that individual’s entire network of connections. The theory is that a person with malicious intent may have a perfectly clean record, but their associations can tell a different story. For instance, imagine an applicant who appears to be a typical business traveler. But when DHS runs the phone numbers of their siblings, one might be linked to a known extremist facilitator. Or perhaps the birthplaces of several extended family members cluster in a specific region known for terrorist recruitment, a fact the applicant didn’t disclose in their own travel history. This third-party data provides threads for investigators to pull on. It allows them to map out connections and identify potential risks that would be completely invisible if they only looked at the applicant in isolation. It’s a shift from individual assessment to network-based risk assessment.
The notice allows a 60-day public comment period. What specific feedback does DHS anticipate from governments in the Visa Waiver Program, and can you share an anecdote where public or allied feedback significantly altered a proposed security screening rule like this one?
DHS is certainly bracing for significant pushback, particularly from the European Union. The EU’s robust data privacy laws, like GDPR, are fundamentally at odds with this kind of broad, invasive data collection. I expect a flood of comments from European governments and privacy advocates questioning the necessity, proportionality, and security of the data being collected. They will demand to know how this information will be stored, who will have access to it, and what redress their citizens will have if their data is misused or their travel is unfairly denied. I recall a few years ago when a different data-sharing agreement was proposed with European partners. The initial U.S. proposal was met with such fierce resistance over privacy and data sovereignty that it had to be completely reworked. The final version included strict limitations on how the data could be used and for how long it could be retained, all as a direct result of allied feedback. That precedent shows that strong, unified opposition from VWP countries can force a significant moderation of these proposals.
What is your forecast for this proposal?
My forecast is that we will see a modified version of this proposal move forward, but not in its current, sweeping form. The administration is clearly committed to tightening screening, and the underlying executive order provides a strong impetus. However, the practical and diplomatic blowback from collecting five years of social media history from millions of citizens of our closest allies will be immense. I predict a compromise. Perhaps the lookback period will be shortened from five years to two, or the type of family data requested will be narrowed. The administration will want to claim a victory on enhancing security, but it cannot afford a major rift with the 40 nations in the Visa Waiver Program or the economic hit from a steep decline in tourism and business travel. The final rule will likely reflect a tense balance between the administration’s security agenda and the diplomatic and economic realities of our international relationships.
